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Abstract 
Scholars have long debated whether there was enough food in Ireland to feed the 
population during the Great Irish Famine; there has been less detailed examination of 
high-frequency data to understand how markets distributed food after the harvests failed. 
This article explores a hitherto unused weekly price and quantity dataset from the Cork 
city markets to analyse how markets may have hindered the distribution of available food 
from 1846 to 1849. Although, historically, economists have long suspected that raw data 
on the market for potatoes during the Irish Famine behaved like that for a classical 
“Giffen” good, there is little evidence for this amongst foodstuffs available throughout 
the crisis in Cork. But bacon pigs—a food that never reached a stable equilibrium but 
completely disappeared from the market in 1847—exhibited some characteristics which 
do not appear to accord with the classical law of demand. Further analysis of this data 
suggests that middle-class purchasing power outbid the poorest people in Ireland at a 
time when there was a surplus of superior foods and a deficiency of inferior foods. These 
circumstances indicate that unusual market behaviour may have made the crop failure’s 
redistributive consequences—as well as its mortality toll—much worse. 
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The Irish Famine is among the worst economic and demographic disasters in the 
history of the British Isles since the Black Death. The crisis began in 1845 with the 
arrival of two potato diseases, phytophora infestans and dry rot, from the Americas.
1
 
These blights reduced potato yields in Ireland by between a third and a quarter in 1845, 
and between 75% and 97% the following year.
2
 Although fiscal transfers from the rest of 
the United Kingdom initially blunted the impact of the harvest failures on the Irish 
economy, a set of severe financial crises resulted in this support being withdrawn.
3
 The 
combination of events soon turned what started out as a manageable harvest crisis into 
one characterised by mass mortality in what folk memory came to call ‘Black ’47’.4   
Many scholars of the famine, including Austin Bourke, Peter Solar and Christine 
Kinealy, have debated whether there was enough food in Ireland to feed the population 
during the worst years, during and after 1847.
5
  In contrast, there has been much less 
interest in using high-frequency data to investigate market patterns during the crisis, and 
assess what effect they had on mortality. This article suggests that, during the worst years 
of the famine period, even those who had sufficient money to create a demand for food or 
were lucky enough to own food resources such as a pig could have been frustrated by 
unusual market behaviour in their attempts to access food. Using a newly-compiled high-
frequency dataset from Cork showing weekly price and quantity information for five 
major food commodities, it analyses demand and supply patterns to investigate whether 
unusual market behaviour—such as that associated with Giffen goods—did occur during 
the famine, and what this means for historians’ understanding of contemporary relief 
efforts. 
To date, economists have tended to suggest that, in overall terms, markets 
‘functioned normally’ during the famine period in Ireland.6  Ó Gráda, in particular, has 
blamed ‘backwards agriculture, coupled with the lack of an adequate policy response 
from the authorities rather than the failure of the markets’, for general shortages of basic 
foodstuffs.
7
 Although Ó Gráda’s overall conclusion that the British policy response on 
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the ground was ineffective is generally accepted, his conclusion about markets tends to 
obscure important individual examples of market disturbances with which government 
policy could have engaged, had the economic forces involved been better understood.  
Market failure, as traditionally defined in economics, occurs when food is not 
allocated through market mechanisms to the economic demand for it. What is more of a 
concern in a famine is the social need for sustenance. While food was needed by the 
hungry to survive, in effect, only those who access to cash or other entitlements could get 
food in the markets. As Sen has pointed out, famine is often best considered as a failure 
of entitlements, ‘economic disaster, not as just food crises’.8 In the Irish Famine it is 
commonly agreed that a failure of entitlements caused many to go without sufficient food 
and die from the consequences: starvation or, more frequently, disease. This article 
addresses the possibility that markets, not only fell down on fulfilling social need by 
servicing economic need instead, but, by the operation of unusual market behaviour, 
worsened, on the basis of need, even the normal economic allocation of food. This 
mechanism is still not normally taken into account in modern famines. Whether this was 
the case in the Irish Famine is therefore an important question.  
An under-explored source of such market behaviour which could have inhibited 
access to food during the Irish famine is the Giffen effect, which in its theoretical form 
strikes at the heart of classical economic theory by appearing to contradict the law of 
demand. In classical economics, on a price (on the y-axis) against quantity (on the x-axis) 
graph, the supply line normally has a positive gradient and the demand line a negative 
gradient and the market price is determined by where the lines cross, when the market 
reaches a state of equilibrium. When the market is disturbed and goes out of equilibrium 
it will tend to return to an equilibrium position, giving stability to the market. The 
demand line slopes down, as originally outlined by Alfred Marshall, due to the law of 
diminishing marginal utility. This states that each additional unit of a good supplied has 
less usefulness to the purchaser than the previous one. However, in an event such as the 
Irish famine, of course, that might well have not been the case. In such a situation, the 
units of food consumed around starvation level—the marginal units that ensure 
survival—may have more utility than the first units of food consumed. For instance, if 
eating a loaf of bread is the bare minimum necessary to avoid death from starvation, only 
buying half a loaf of bread, in theory, would be useless. 
Alfred Marshall thus outlined an exception to his law of demand to take into 
account subsistence situations: the Giffen effect. This describes cases where a demand 
line for a good has a positive gradient, ie. demand increases as the price increases. Recent 
mainstream scholarship has added a number of requirements for a good to be named 
‘Giffen’. It must be an inferior good and when its price rises the income effect must be 
greater than the substitution effect. 
9
 But few real life examples of goods have earned the 
title ‘Giffen’, probably because such a situation is likely to be very short lived. 
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Irrespective of any theoretical requirements about the naming of the effect, any 
equilibrium where the demand line has a positive gradient will be unstable, whatever the 
slope of the supply line, because an increase in demand causes an increase in price which 
calls forward even more demand. In such a case, markets will set themselves on a course 
for self-destruction. Foods will continue to sell, whatever the price, until they have run 
out: the exact opposite of Thomas Malthus’ view of markets as ensuring supplies of food 
would be eked out in a famine. Those in need cannot afford to buy, but those who can 
afford the food at the increased price, do so enthusiastically, when they are buying a good 
that is inferior to their normal fare (in other words cheaper), but is a good replacement, 
and where most food prices are increasing. They do this to maintain their lifestyles when 
costs are increasing. The chaos caused is the popular view of ‘market failure’ to provide 
for social need but it also fulfils the theoretical definition by causing misallocation of 
food resources to economic demand because after a short time there is no food to fulfil 
the demand.  
In particular, such a misallocation could have occurred in the famine period, when 
supplies of meat were plentiful but supplies of staple foods such as potatoes and wheat 
were in short supply. Ireland was a dairy and beef farming country and had large numbers 
of cattle in the famine period. For the available food to be shared out across the existing 
demand, most people would have had to trade up the food quality scale. However, as we 
shall see, market disturbances resembling a Giffen effect resulted in middle-income 
consumers moving down the food scale from beef to pork or bacon when the price of the 
superior good squeezed their incomes. The circumstances resulted in them depriving the 
poorer classes of their supplies. It could be argued that any disequilibrium would have 
been a short one. However, although the economist John Maynard Keynes may have said 
that ‘in the long-run we are all dead’, in a famine, where a temporary deficiency of 
calories easily weaken people with nutritional diseases and contagious infections, a short-
run disequilibrium is sufficient for famine to kill. 
I 
Alfred Marshall first outlined Giffen goods as an exception to his law of demand 
in the 1895 edition of Principles of Economics and ascribed the original observation to 
Sir Robert Giffen, a Scottish statistician and economist, in connection with bread: 
 As Mr. Giffen has pointed out, a rise in the price of bread makes so 
large a drain on the resources of the poorer labouring families and raises 
so much the marginal utility of money to them, that they are forced to 
curtail their consumption of meat and the more expensive farinaceous 
foods: and, bread being still the cheapest food which they can get and will 
take, they consume more, and not less of it.
10
 
The ‘Giffen’ effect Marshall described has since been incorporated into classical 
economic theory, to an extent, by modelling it in the Slutsky equation as a situation 
where an income effect, due to a price rise, outweighs the impact of a substitution effect 
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 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1895) 208-9. 
upon the quantity demanded of the good. Despite a lack of empirical evidence in support 
of Marshall’s conjecture, a discussion of Giffen goods as an accepted phenomenon has 
featured in almost every major economics textbook published in the last fifty years and 
still remains ‘a source of inspiration’ to theoretical researchers in the twenty-first, 
according to Wim Heijman and Pierre von Mouche.
11
   
Some economists, including John Nachbar, have attempted to deny the existence 
of Giffen goods.
12
 They have been supported by studies of Marshall’s original example 
by George Stigler in 1947, Roger Koenker in 1977 and Liam Brunt in 2013, which have 
argued that the demand curves for bread and flour in Britain were never upward sloping 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.
13
 From the 1960s, the potato during the Irish 
famine of 1845-49 has been cited as the classic example of a Giffen good; first in Paul 
Samuelson’s Economics, which confused Sir Robert Giffen with Sir Francis Drake.14 
Mentions followed in works by Edgar Browning, Heinz Kohler, Richard Leftwich, 
Donald McCloskey, Walter Nicholson and Liam Kennedy.
15
   
By contrast, Gerald Dwyer and Cotton Lindsay have argued that the idea is 
flawed theoretically as ‘there were not more but fewer potatoes available; the Irish people 
could not have eaten more as a group’ and so put the price up as they transferred from 
other foods, even after a price rise.
16
 They concluded that ‘the place to look for a Giffen 
good is not a peasant economy engaged in subsistence farming’.17 This position has since 
been supported by Nachbar, Terrence McDonough and Joseph Eisenhauer.
18
 But this 
conclusion has been criticised in that it ignores other types of commodities in famine 
Ireland. Ulrich Kohli has replied to Dwyer and Lindsay with the argument that meat in 
famine conditions is more likely than potatoes to display Giffen behaviour, on theoretical 
grounds.
19
   
Investigating the case that the Irish potato could have been a Giffen good, Otis 
Gilley and Gordon Karels have shown that theoretically, a demand curve for this 
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(1984) 188.   
17 Ibid., 190-1. 
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19 U. Kohli, ‘Robert Giffen and the Irish Potato: Note’, American Economic Review 76 (1986) 539-41. 
subsistence good, could have a positive-gradient middle section if it is considered in 
tandem with meat and with two restraints, a budgetary one and a minimum nutritional 
standard one.
20
 Robert Jensen and Nolan Miller, who claimed to have shown the first 
evidence of the Giffen effect on an individual basis in the real world, gathered their own 
data from an experiment in an artificial environment with vouchers for rice in China.
21
 
Their theoretical explanation for their results developed Gilley and Karels’s theories. 
They proposed a three zone demand curve dependent on wealth. When a consumer with a 
choice of staple food or meat is relatively wealthy they will respond to an increase in 
price of the staple by eating less of it and more meat. This gives a conventional negative 
gradient for the part of the demand curve in which the condition applies. As their wealth 
decreases, they enter what Jensen and Miller have called the ‘subsistence zone’ where 
they can only just afford enough to eat.
22
 Now they will respond to price increases of the 
staple by eating more of it and less meat leading to an unconventional positive demand 
curve, which produces the visible ‘Giffen effect’. When they cannot afford the nutritional 
minimum, only the staple is bought and when the price increases they are forced to buy 
less of it and the demand line is negative once again, as according to the normal law of 
demand. Expressed graphically, this produces a “Z-shaped” demand curve with a 
negative-positive-negative gradient. 
Liam Brunt and Drew Zhu are amongst those continuing to try to incorporate the 
Giffen effect into mainstream theory.
 23
 In particular, Zhu supplies the theory behind the 
findings in the working paper version of this research. However, the main thrust of the 
argument presented here is the consequence of the effect experienced by the ordinary 
person in the real world and the possible lessons for the management of future famines, 
rather than the exact classification of the underlying theory.  That the effect existed in the 
real world is undeniable from the data given below. 
II 
The method used here is to identify initially which goods were exhibiting normal 
demand behaviour by inspecting the raw data, much as Robert Giffen would have done as 
Comptroller of the Corn Returns at the Board of Trade after 1876. The chosen example is 
then subjected to analysis on the basis of modern economic theory to roughly identify the 
gradient of the actual demand curve. It should be noted that the limitation of the historical 
data means that the effect can only be examined at the market level and not at the 
individual level, and can only consider the middle part of a “Z-shaped” demand curve. 
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For the empirical data in the present study, price and quantity sold for potatoes, 
wheat, barley, oats, and bacon pigs in the Cork markets was collected from the 
Constitution or Cork Advertiser on a weekly basis for the complete run from January 
1845 to December 1849.
24
 This paper provides the market reports most consistently and 
completely; although most Irish newspapers of this period provide market prices for food, 
no other Irish newspaper has a robust run of price and quantity data for the same period. 
The market reports cover all the marketplaces in 1840s Cork, providing an interesting 
case study of market behaviour in this city during the famine. In addition, the data are 
also not subject to political bias for, although the paper’s stance was pro-Union, the same 
reports also appeared sporadically in the pro-Repeal Cork Southern Reporter.  
Initially the data are presented in the results section as scatter diagrams on price 
against quantity graphs. The points on these indicate the equilibrium (or crossing points) 
of demand and supply lines and not the actual lines. However, they provide a quick check 
on whether there is tendency for the quantity sold to increase with increasing price. An 
ordinary least squares estimation is shown on the graphs, but again this only shows the 
variation in equilibrium points.  
To identify the separate demand and supply lines in the example chosen for 
analysis, a simultaneous equation model is partially estimated using the reduced form 
method.
25
 Only the gradient for the demand line is required, the rest of equations do not 
need to be identified. Supply and demand are assumed to be simultaneously determined 
by the interaction between them. An exogenous variable, F, which affects the quantity 
supplied but not directly the quantity demanded, is included. 
  = + P + F +      and       (1) 
 =  + P +     respectively,     (2)
26
 
where   is the quantity of pigs supplied 
  is the quantity of pigs demanded 
 P is pig-price 
 α and β represent various coefficients  
 and ε represents error terms which are uncorrelated with the variables (p = 0.348). 
                                                 
24 The Constitution or Cork Advertiser, January 1845-December 1849. 
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Q and P are endogenous variables, i.e. determined within the model, while F is 
determined by factors outside the model. 
At equilibrium, quantity supplied, = quantity demanded,  (3) 
Solving the resulting equation, the price and quantity at equilibrium can be 
represented by straight line equations (of the form y = mx + c) on graphs of price and 
quantity against F: 
 P* = +      (4) 
 Q* = +  +    (5) 
Extracting the coefficients of F, it can be seen that the ratio of the gradient on the 
quantity against F graph to gradient on price against F graph gives the gradient of the 
demand line, i.e: 
   = .       (6) 
The slope of the demand line can therefore be calculated from these gradients 
which can be estimated using ordinary least squares. In order to identify whether there 
was behaviour with Giffen characteristics we do not need to know about other parts of 
the demand line equation or the equation for the supply line. 
III 
The results of the initial scatter diagrams, particularly for potatoes, show a 
distribution compatible with normal market conditions with the exception of that for 
bacon pigs which shows a slight positive trend (Chart 1). 
Therefore the bacon pig market, and not the potato market, is the best candidate 
for detailed analysis of the demand line, a conclusion that agrees with Kohli’s supposition 
that meat markets may be the best place to look for Giffen goods. The choice of an 
exogenous variable is limited by available data, and the price of potatoes is proposed here 
as an increase in the price of potatoes would have increased the supply of pigs on the 
market. Farmed pigs were fed on potatoes and domestic pigs on potato scraps (although 
some foraged for themselves), so as potatoes increased in price, more pigs would have 
been put on sale for farmers to buy food, but it is assumed that the price of potatoes did 
not affect the quantity of pigs demanded directly as contemporary sources indicate that 
they were not substitute goods at the time. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Comparative scatter chart for Cork wheat, barley, oats, pigs and potatoes for the 
period January 1845 to December 1849. Price is shown on the y-axis and quantity on the 
x-axis. Wheat, barley and oats were priced in shillings per twenty stone barrels and 
quantity was in barrels. Pigs were priced in shillings per hundred-weight and the quantity 
was in pigs sold.  Potatoes were priced in pence per stone. 
Sources: Market Reports, Constitution or Cork Advertiser, January 1845 to December 
1849. 
The analysis is therefore carried out and the results shown in Table 1. As 
anticipated the variable F, the price of potatoes (pot-p), has an effect on or correlates with 
the quantity of pigs and with the price of pigs. The R squared values are low, but this is 
not surprising with historic data of this sort. 
 
 
 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
T-ratio P-value R 
squared 
Bacon pigs 
quantity (pigs) 
against F 
30.3964 11.1550 2.725 0.0069 0.0298 
Bacon pigs price 
(shillings) 
against F 
0.512601 0.0965 5.314 <0.00001 0.0986 
 
Table 1: Results of ordinary least squares regressions using data points from 4 January 
1845 to 22 December 1849. Calculations performed in gretl software, 260 observations.  
 
 From the regression results, the gradient of the demand line is therefore: 
 
 =    30.3964      = 59.2984 
            0.512601 
This ratio is for the price against quantity graph drawn with the axis reversed from 
convention which places the price on the y-axis, so for a conventional graph the gradient 
is 1/59.2984 = 0.01686. For the purposes of visualisation a line of that gradient can be 
drawn on the scatter chart of price-quantity points (Chart 2). The displacement above the 
x-axis has not been calculated and is therefore not shown accurately. However, the 
gradient of the demand line can be shown and is firmly positive. This method is subject 
to some bias with small datasets, but with 260 observations it is reasonable to assume this 
is too low to affect the gradient sign.
27
 Bacon pigs therefore quite probably exhibited 
some sort of behaviour that does not conform to that exhibited by normally-behaved 
goods at the level of the Cork markets in Ireland in the famine period and the associated 
market disruption took place. 
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Chart 2: A line with the same gradient as the demand line shown on the scatter graph for 
bacon pigs, price against quantity. 
Sources: As Chart 1. 
IV 
This agrees with contemporary descriptions and other economic data. The 
Constitution noted, with surprise, that from January 1847 all the pigs and other items of 
cheaper food had disappeared from impoverished areas around Cork.
28
 It was noted that 
pigs for sale were plentiful and in a similar range of sizes to previously.
29
 The cause of 
the effect can be identified as middle-income consumers trading down from beef to the 
cheaper bacon to maintain their lifestyles when the prices of cheaper staples such as pork 
were rising in price, combined with the peasants selling their capital assets to try and 
obtain money to buy food to replace the potatoes which they had grown and which had 
failed.   
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 Cork Examiner, 4 November 1846; 13 November 1846. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 3: Retail price of beef (d/lb, top line) and bacon (d/lb, bottom line) in the Cork 
markets 1845-47. 
Sources: Market Reports, The Constitution or Cork Advertiser. 
 The trading down of the middle classes can be demonstrated by comparing beef 
and bacon prices in the Cork markets (Chart 3). In 1846, the year in which totalled per 
annum pig sales in Cork increased almost 100 per cent to 64,114 from just 33,063 in 
1845, beef prices fell sharply to near those of bacon, which maintained previous levels.  
Such price movement is consistent with consumers changing from beef to bacon. 
Evidence for financial pressure causing peasants to sell pigs comes from qualitative and 
quantitative sources. The contemporary guide to Ireland by Hall describes how, when the 
potato crop was diminished in size, the peasants could have recourse to their pigs, ‘fed 
upon anything’ without ‘expense’, selling them to buy cheaper food whereas in normal 
times it was ‘the pig that “pays the rent”’.30 Real wage levels can be shown to be low in 
the years in which pig sales were high: 1842, 1844, 1845 and 1846 (Chart 4). Such sales 
were probably accompanied by panic, both panic selling and buying. As classical 
economic theory depends upon rational human behaviour, so some sort of Giffen effect in 
Ireland might have arisen from panic.  
 Despite the low quality of the historical data and theoretical difficulties in analysis 
because of the lack of income information, there are strong indications that some sort of 
unusual market behaviour resulted in greater middle-income demand for inferior meats 
encouraging the poorer classes to sell their emergency capital and food reserves in 
circumstances of rising prices in which the money exchanged rapidly lost its real value. 
Furthermore, the collapse of the pig population to very low levels in 1847 indirectly 
made the famine worse in 1848-49, as pigs were no longer available to convert food 
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 S. C. Hall, Ireland: Its Scenery, Character etc. (London: Jeremiah How, 1843) Volume III, p. 451.   
inedible by humans, such as potato peelings and foraged vegetation, into calories for 
human consumption. 
Although sales of bacon pigs in the Cork markets increased sharply in 1846, (by 
over 100% in November 1846 compared to the same month in the previous year (see 
Chart 5), these increased volumes were not exported. National exports of pigs for 
November 1846 were only 20% above the monthly average of 1845.
31
  It is reasonable 
therefore to assume that the majority were bought to consume in Ireland.  
Evidence for financial pressure causing peasants to sell pigs comes from 
qualitative and quantitative sources. The contemporary guide to Ireland by Hall describes 
how, when the potato crop was diminished in size, the peasants could have recourse to 
their pigs, ‘fed upon anything’ without ‘expense’, selling them to buy cheaper food 
whereas in normal times it was ‘the pig that “pays the rent”’.32  Real wage levels can be 
shown to be low in the years in which pig sales were high: 1842, 1844, 1845 and 1846 
(Chart 4).
33
  
The consequences of this unusual market behaviour during the famine period 
were probably significant and more widespread than around Cork. Panic selling, later 
regretted, was noted as a general symptom of the famine, at the time, in the Freeman’s 
Journal: 
Those farmers in Ireland who sold their food soon after the harvest at a 
low price have some of them since bought it back, re-imported to answer 
their demand, at double the price they sold it for, and others of them have 
died of starvation because they have not wherewithal to repurchase it.
34
 
When more than three-quarters of the potato crop failed in late-1846, peasants, 
with few scraps left to feed the pigs and facing financial ruin, with their landlords chasing 
rent arrears in the face of continuing mortgages payments, tithes and Poor Law rates 
during these same months, were forced to sell their pigs to pay the rent, creating a large 
quantity on the market in 1846. 
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Chart 4: Purchasing power index of real wages, from the Freeman’s Journal agricultural 
wage statistics adjusted for living costs, both indexed to 1837=100.  Large falls in Irish 
real wages are evident in 1842, 1844, 1845 and 1846, the same years that strong unusual 
market behaviour is reported in the Cork bacon pig market. 
Sources: F. Geary and T. Stark, ‘Trends in real wages during the industrial revolution: a 
view from across the Irish Sea’, Economic History Review (2004) pp. 362-395; F. A. 
D’Arcy, ‘Wages of Labourers in the Dublin Building Industry, 1667-1918’, Saothar 14 
(1989) pp. 23-24; Freeman’s Journal, 24 January 1837, 18 September 1839, 7 February 
1840, 18 July 1842, 8 January 1846, 7 February 1840, 20 May 1846, 26 June 1846,  6 
May 1847, 16 June 1847, 5 January 1850, 2 May 1850. 
They ran out of pigs by the start of 1847, with market volumes of bacon pigs and 
other foods falling to very low levels that year, as the Constitution noted in its market 
reports.
35
  The large pigs were sold in similar sizes to previously, and the smaller pigs 
drowned if they competed for food with humans.
36
  But one would expect such a high 
initial supply to reduce bacon pig prices and thus inhibit sales. Instead, it appears that that 
bacon pig prices rose in 1846 as for previous years since 1842. Thus we see the stronger 
effect was an abnormal demand curve as the middle classes traded down to bacon, from 
other meats such as beef, which they were less able to afford because their incomes were 
reduced in real terms by rising food prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Constitution or Cork Advertiser, 5 January 1847. 
36 Cork Examiner, 4 November 1846, 13 November 1846. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5: Bacon Pig price s/cwt (left hand scale) and quantity of bacon pigs sold (right 
hand scale) for Cork Markets 1842-49. An overall view of the data. 
Source: Market Reports, Constitution or Cork Advertiser. 
The unusual behaviour resulted in greater middle class demand for inferior meats 
encouraging the poorer classes to sell their emergency capital and food reserves in 
circumstances of rising prices in which the money exchanged rapidly lost its real value. 
Furthermore, the collapse of the pig population to very low levels in 1847 may have 
indirectly made the famine worse in 1848-49 as pigs were no longer available to convert 
food inedible by humans, such as potato peelings and foraged vegetation, into calories for 
human consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6: Potato price in pence per stone (left hand scale) and quantity delivered cartloads 
(right hand scale) for Cork Markets 1842-49. 
Source: Market Reports, Constitution or Cork Advertiser. 
This downward tendency in the quality of food demanded by the middle class 
worked against the adjustment necessary if the food available in 1847 was to be 
distributed equitably amongst the population on the basis of need. A new calculation has 
been performed for 1847 which suggests that meat accounted for 16.0% of available food 
energy towards the end of the year. This compares with a rough estimate of 8.6% for 
1845.  
Type of food Grain Meal Vegetables Meat Total 
Total energy/ 
day x10
9
 
KJ/day 
30.94 
(37%) 
2.38 
(3%) 
 
37.16 
(44%) 
13.38 
(16%) 
83.86 
Table 2: Total food energy available in 1847 in Ireland as a snapshot view in the autumn 
of that year 
 
Figures for food production and trade (imports and exports) have been taken from 
the final figures published by the government in 1849 in a Parliamentary Paper.
37
 In 
effect, the calculation shows a snapshot in time for the calendar year 1847, and excluded 
any diseased crops which were inedible because the counts were made for goods in 
storage. Crops were said to be fairly reliably estimated by the government by that point in 
time. The energy value of commercial-farm animals have been included, and so their 
products such as milk, cheese, butter and meat products have been excluded, but neither 
has allowance been made for their food. This models the situation in which they are 
killed and eaten, which resembles the actual situation in places such as Cork where 
supplies of bacon pigs were exhausted. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the official 
government estimates only covered commercial farms and so the family bacon pigs 
owned by poor labourers are therefore missing from the analysis. For the 1845 figures, as 
government records were not kept of this year, an adjustment has been made to the potato 
quantity available as Bourke’s estimates with other figures retained as 1847 to give a 
rough idea of the comparison.
38
 
The results mean that on average everyone in Ireland would have had to eat about 
double the amount of meat in 1847, compared with their consumption in 1845, in order 
for the available food to be shared out equitably. This alternative strategy for sharing out 
the food when compared with the reality of the middle class trading down and the poor 
losing their stock of pigs demonstrates how the Giffen effect caused considerable 
disruption to food supplies for the poor. 
V 
Famine continues to be ever present in the modern world. At the time of writing 
famines exist in Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa, South Sudan and Yemen. 
Economic historians have developed the concept of measuring the integration of markets 
as an indication of whether the mechanisms of a price and quantity equilibrium and food 
allocation were operating as their theory predicted.
39
 Based on this experience, the World 
Food Programme assesses the integration of markets in modern areas of famine and uses 
the result to decide whether to offer assistance in kind, cash or as food vouchers.
40
 
                                                 
37 Returns of agricultural produce in Ireland in the year 1847 Parliamentary Paper 1847 (923) LVII.1 pp. 
1-108 plus Returns of agricultural produce in Ireland in the year 1847 Pt. II Stock Parliamentary Papers 
1847 (1000) LVII.109 pp. 109-132  less exports plus imports as Returns of the quantity of grain and 
flour of all sorts imported into Ireland, from 1st January 1839 to 1st January 1849; of grain and flour 
and other agricultural produce imported from Ireland into Great Britain... Parliamentary Papers 1849 
(588) L.403 pp. 403-27. 
38 P. M. A. Bourke, ‘The extent of the potato crop at the time of the famine’, JSSISI, 20 (1960) 1-35, 2. 
39 G. Federico, ‘How much do we know about market integration in Europe?’, Economic History Review 
65  (2012)  470-1. 
40 J. Hoddinott, interview with author, 11 February 2014; for example in Chile: “Building Resilience, 
Protecting Livelihoods and Reducing Malnutrition of Refugees, Returnees and other Vulnerable 
People”, World Food Programme, WFP/EB.2/2014/8-B/4; see also recent research investigating the 
effectiveness of food vouchers against food and cash transfers, ‘The economics of food subsidies: 
Feeding expectations’, The Economist, 22 February 2014, and M. Hidrobo, J. Hoddinott, A. Peterman, 
 However, despite the apparent increasing political nature of famines, there seems 
to be no assessment by relief agencies of how the food stocks of the poor may be 
absorbed by the wealthier classes. The results from the Cork market data suggest that 
unusual market behaviour in the Irish famine took place, not in subsistence-level 
households consuming potatoes, but amongst the wealthier classes consuming meat. This 
conclusion concurs with Kohli’s suggestion that meat is more likely than potatoes or 
bread to display Giffen behaviour in famine Ireland and Doi, Iwasa and Shimomura’s 
conclusion that Giffen behaviour theoretically can be observed in classes of people with 
incomes well above subsistence levels.
41
   
In addition the results can be interpreted as agreeing with Gilley and Karels as 
well as Jensen and Millers’s theories of a multi slope demand line. This study could only 
look at the Giffen effect on the market scale, not at the individual scale. It is possible that 
as potatoes rose in price only a few people were ever in the ‘subsistence zone’ with a 
positive demand line at one time whilst many were in the below nutritional minimum 
group with a negative demand line. So the overall market position seems conventional. 
When pork and beef are looked at however, pork takes the position of the staple good, but 
few of the middle classes fall below the nutritional minimum, so the population in the 
positive gradient demand line zone is much larger and the effect shows up overall. That is 
not to say that the high income elasticity of meat, as in Kohli’s observations, did not have 
an effect as well. 
However, the overall market effect is what matters in a famine as this is what 
starves a population and leaves them at the mercy of disease. The trading down of the 
middle classes and sudden disappearance of all edible goods amongst the subsistence 
classes from the area around Cork at the beginning of 1847 are frightening examples of 
unseen and misunderstood economic forces at work. The appearance of market behaviour 
with similarities to the Giffen effect amongst the wealthy would have caused substantial 
difficulties in the Cork area for those at the bottom of the food scale. There is 
considerable scope for the application of this idea in the study of more recent famines, 
where the middle and upper classes may absorb food stocks of cheaper food essential for 
the survival and health of the poor.  
Charles Read 
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 See Kohli, ‘Robert Giffen and the Irish Potato: Note’, 539-541; J. Doi, K. Iwasa, and K. Shimomura, 
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